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According to insurance theory, agents who have insurance coverage have less incentives to make preventive
actions. In this paper, we argue that the optimality of a deductible [Shavell, S., 1979. On moral hazard and
insurance, Quarterly Journal of Economics 93, 541–562.] cannot be extended to the health insurance sector.
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1. Introduction
In the different insurance sectors, policy holders can take preventive actions to reduce the probability
that the bad state of the world occurs. Insurance theoreticians analyze the consequences of imperfect
monitoring of policy holders’ preventive actions. Shavell (1979) shows that preventive actions may be
discouraged by insurance coverage by reducing the variation of wealth between states of the world.
Besides, because of imperfect monitoring of their preventive actions, policy holders cannot internalize
the benefits from their actions through a decrease in their insurance premiums. When policy holders
choose complete coverage, Shavell proved that no preventive actions are taken. Consequently, insurance0165-1765/
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mutualization and incentives to reduce ex ante moral hazard inefficiencies.
This result is consistent with several insurance sectors where goods are replaceable.1 However, ex
ante moral hazard analysis in the field of health insurance has also to take account of health risk
specificities. Curative and preventive treatments are not always perfect substitutes as the efficiency of
curative treatments often depends on the preventive actions realized before. Health risk and health state
are more closed to the irreplaceable good problem described by Cook and Graham relative to the goods
covered in other insurance sectors.
Consequently, whatever the extent of coverage, preventive actions in this sector have repercussions on
the policy holders’ expected health state. Even if they are fully insured against medical expenses, they
have an incentive to spend to reduce the risk of being ill due to the fact that illness involves a utility loss.
In this paper, we suggest an ex ante moral hazard model where policy holders’ preferences are
represented by a bi-dimensional utility function, with the health state as the second dimension. Using this
sanitary dimension, we show that Shavell’s result is not always consistent: the optimal health insurance
contract may contain no deductible. The intuition is that a deductible lowers the policy holders’ wealths
in case of illness and then increases the marginal disutility of expenses in preventive actions because of
the decreasing marginal utility function (reflecting risk aversion in the expected utility framework). This
effect paradoxically tends to discourage preventive actions.
The first section describes the assumptions of the model, the second section derives the optimal health
insurance contract and the third section concludes.2. Framework
We consider a representative consumer subject to the following assumptions:
! Two states of the world can occur, X={B, G}. The state illness is noted B, and G is the state good
health. Each state of the world (B or G) is characterized by a pair (wB; hB) and (wG; hG) which define
the wealth w and the health state h of the representative consumer in the two states of the world. For
simplicity, we consider that health states hB and hG are constant, with hGNhB. We note
Dh=hGhBN0 the health state loss caused by the disease.
! The probability of illness is denoted p. The consumer can decrease this probability taking preventive
actions ez0. We assume pup(e) with pV(e)V0 and pW(e)z0. We consider a health risk non-
deterministic in the sense that: p(0)b1 and limeYl p eð Þ ¼ plN0.
These assumptions imply that pV converges to 0. This property implies that the marginal gain of the
preventive actions becomes negligible when these preventive actions are high enough.
The two states of the world belonging to the set X have two components: a financial risk and a risk of
deterioration of the health state. In order to capture this second risk, we use a bi-dimensional utility
function to represent the consumer’s preferences. The consumer chooses a preventive effort level not
only to reduce the financial risk but also to protect against the health state risk.1
Replaceable in the sense of Cook and Graham (1977).
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to be additively separable:
v w; hð Þ ¼ u wð Þ þ h: ð1Þ
This function is increasing and concave in wealth thus capturing risk aversion. The additive form of
the utility function allows the avoidance of wealth effects.2 Besides we assume no risk-aversion in the
health dimension in order to show that opposite results can be obtained even though we have a body of
assumptions very close to the Shavell’s one. This utility function can equally be interpreted as a state-
dependent utility function with an additive form (Karni, 1983). We assume too that this function verifies
Inada’s conditions: limwYl uV wð Þ ¼ l and limwYl uV wð Þ ¼ 0.3. Ex ante moral hazard and optimal health insurance contract
Wealth levels in the two states of the world are:
wGuw̃G e; I ; hð Þ ¼ w0  e hI ; wBuw̃B e; I ; hð Þ ¼ w0  eþ 1 hð ÞI  L
¼ w̃S e; I ; hð Þ þ I  L;
where I is the indemnity received by policy holders when they fall ill, L the health expenditure level in
case of illness and h is the premium by unit of coverage. In the case of full coverage (I=L):
w̃G= w̃B=w(e, I;h).
Since we are interested in the problem of ex ante moral hazard, the level of preventive actions is
determined by policy holders and is denoted by ẽ. The objective of policy holders is to maximize their
expected utility:
ẽ I ; hð Þ ¼ argmax
e
pd u w̃Bð Þ þ hB½  þ 1 pð Þd u w̃Gð Þ þ hG½ 
where ẽ is implicitly defined by the first-order condition of this program:
 pVd u w̃Gð Þ  u w̃Bð Þ þ Dhð Þ ¼ puV w̃Bð Þ þ 1 pð ÞuV w̃Gð Þ: ð2Þ




Ev ¼  pVd u w̃Gð Þ  u w̃Bð Þð Þ  pd uV w̃Bð Þ  1 pð Þd uV w̃Gð Þ:





. With this bi-dimensional utility function, even though the health insurance premium is2
This choice can be justified because the debate on the sign of U12 is still open (Rey, 2003).
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implies that policy holders only partially internalize the benefit of their preventive actions.
It is interesting to write Shavell’s program to characterize the optimal health insurance contract in our
bivariate framework. Since interested in the optimum,3 we have h=p(e). This condition means that the
optimum analysis takes into account the impact of the effort on the premium, hence the effort level only
depends on the coverage I:
 pV eð Þ u w̃G e; I ; p eð Þð Þð Þ  u w̃B e; I ; p eð Þð Þð Þ þ Dh½  ¼ p eð ÞuV w̃B e; I ; p eð Þð Þð Þ
þ 1 p eð Þð ÞuV w̃G e; I ; p eð Þð Þð Þ:
We denote êu ê(I) the solution in e of the preceding equation. We also define the level of effort for
full coverage in the context of imperfect monitoring as e*= ê(L).
Expected utility is then computed using h=p(e) and the optimal effort done by policy holders ê. By
noting V(I), the expected utility with imperfect information is:
V Ið Þ ¼ p êð Þ u w̃B ê; Ið Þ; p êð Þð Þ þ hB½  þ 1 p êð Þð Þ u w̃G ê; I ; p êð Þð Þð Þ þ hG½ :
The optimal coverage level is given by the maximization of V(I).
V V Ið Þu êVpV u w̃Gð Þ  u w̃Bð Þ þ Dh½   êV puV w̃Bð Þ þ 1 pð ÞuV w̃Gð Þ½   êVpVI ½puV w̃Bð Þ
þ 1 pð ÞuV w̃Gð Þ  pd puV w̃Bð Þ þ 1 pð ÞuV w̃Gð Þ½  þ puV w̃Bð Þ:
For full coverage, we obtain:
V V Lð Þ ¼  êV Lð ÞpV e4ð ÞLuV w e4; L; p e4ð Þð Þð Þ: ð4Þ
The sign of VV(L) only depends on the sign of êV(L) and we have
êV Lð Þ ¼ pV e4ð ÞuW w e4;L; p e4ð Þð Þð Þ  p e4ð ÞuW w e4;L; p e4ð Þð Þð Þ
pW e4ð ÞDh uW w e4; L; p e4ð Þð Þð Þ
Proposition 1. If  uW w0e4p e4ð ÞLð Þ
uV w0e4p e4ð ÞLð Þ z
pV e4ð Þ
p e4ð Þ , in the neighborhood of full coverage, preventive efforts
are increasing with the indemnity level.
When the indemnity level varies, two effects are seen. The first is the traditional decrease in incentives
explained by Shavell: the increase of the indemnity level decreases the marginal benefit of preventive
actions. The second one was already present in the Shavell’s analysis but was eliminated in the situation
of full coverage. When the indemnity level increases, all other things equal, the policy holders become
richer when the bad state of the world occurs. This last effect comes from the decrease of the marginal
utility function that reduces the cost of preventive actions in the state B.4 The case êV(L)N0 occurs when3
No welfare loss is due to positive loading factor.
4
If preventive actions are not monetary, but rather inseparable from money utility terms, this effect and its consequences do not hold. In this
case, the optimal deductible is positive.
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low enough. Then, the incentives generated by a decrease in the indemnity level are too low and are
dominated by the wealth effect that implies an increase in the marginal cost of preventive actions.
Corollary 1. If the condition within Proposition 1 holds, full coverage is optimal.4. Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to underline that it is sometimes ill advised to apply traditional insurance
models to the health insurance sector. We take into account of the health risk specificities via a bi-
dimensional utility function that captures the risk of deterioration of health.
We showed that this second dimension can be a sufficient condition to make policy holders take
preventive actions. Our result implies that according to the health state variation intensity, it may be
suboptimal to introduce deductibles. We can interpret this result in the following sense: for small
diseases, a deductible may be optimal to introduce incentives when the bnatural incentivesQ are not
strong enough, however for strong disease, full coverage is optimal. In this last case, the introduction of
a deductible lowers the incentives by increasing the marginal cost of preventive actions. This result
implies that the presence of deductibles must be contingent at the severity of illness.References
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